"every created being is distant, by an equal degree of inferiority, from that which is the Highest"

"every created being is distant, by an equal degree of inferiority, from that which
is the Highest, Who is unapproachable by reason of the sublimity of His Being: the whole universe is in value the same distance beneath Him. For that which is absolutely inaccessible does not allow access to some one thing while it is unapproachable by another, but it transcends all existences by an equal sublimity." (Or cat. 27,4)

"the term ungenerate is no part of the essence, but is indicative of a difference of conceptions"

"But if we are compelled to this conclusion by truth and the force of our premises, it is clear that the term ungenerate is no part of the essence, but is indicative of a difference of conceptions, distinguishing that which is generated from that which is ungenerate." (Con. Eun. 2.1.34)

"εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἥ τε ἀλή θεια καὶ ἡ τῶν κειμένων ἀκολουθία καταναγκάζει, πρό δηλον ὅτι οὐχὶ οὐσίας ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγέννητον ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ δια φορᾶς τινος νοημάτων σημαντικὸν τῆς τὸ γεννηθὲν τοῦ μὴ γεννηθέντος διαστελλούσης."

"the mind passes from the Son to the Father"

"They who according to the ordinance of the Lord believe in the Father, when they hear the name of the Father, receive the Son along with Him in their thought, as the mind passes from the Son to the Father, without treading on an unsubstantial vacuum interposed between them. But those who are diverted to the title “ungenerate” instead of Father, get a bare notion of this name, learning only the fact that He did not at any time come into being, not that He is Father." (Ref. conf. Eun. 100)

οἱ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ δεσπότου εἰς τὸν πατέρα τὴν πίστιν ἔχοντες ὁμοῦ τῷ ἀκοῦσαι τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τῇ διανοίᾳ συμπαρεδέξαντο, οὐδενὶ τῷ μεταξὺ διαστήματι τῆς διανοίας ἀπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα κενεμβατούσης. οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ πατρὸς παρενεχθέντες πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου κλῆσιν ψιλὴν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου ἀναλαμβάνουσιν ἔννοιαν, μόνον τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι αὐτὸν διδασκόμενοι, οὐ μὴν καὶ τὸ πατέρα εἶναι.

"Why do they pronounce this ‘Ungeneracy’ to be the only intrinsic character in the Father, and thrust all the rest aside?"

"Why do they pronounce this ‘Ungeneracy’ to be the only intrinsic character in the Father, and thrust all the rest aside? It is in order that they may impair the mode of likeness, by this contrast as regards the begotten." (Con Eun. 1.1.143)

καὶ διὰ τί μόνον συμφυὲς ἀξίωμα τὴν ἀγεννησίαν ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς δογματίζουσι, τὰ λοιπὰ παρωσά μενοι; ἵνα τῇ πρὸς τὸ γεννητὸν ἀντιδιαστολῇ τὸν τῆς ὁμοιότητος
κακουργήσωσι τρόπον.

Wide and insurmountable is the interval that divides and fences off uncreated from created nature

Yet, if we weigh even their comprehension with the majesty of Him Who really is, it may be that if any one should venture to say that even their power of understanding is not far superior to our own weakness, his conjecture would fall within the limits of probability, for wide and insurmountable is the interval that divides and fences off uncreated from created nature (πολὺ γὰρ τὸ μέσον καὶ ἀδιεξίτητον, ᾦ πρὸς τὴν κτιστὴν οὐσίαν ἠ ἄκτιστος φύσις διατετείχισται). The latter is limited, the former not. The latter is confined within its own boundaries according to the pleasure of its Maker. The former is bounded only by infinity. The latter stretches itself out within certain degrees of extension, limited by time and space: the former transcends all notion of degree, baffling curiosity from every point of view. In this life we can apprehend the beginning and the end of all things that exist, but the beatitude that is above the creature admits neither end nor beginning, but is above all that is connoted by either, being ever the same, self-dependent, not travelling on by degrees from one point to another in its life; for there is no participation of other life in its life, such that we might infer end and beginning; but, be it what it may, it is life energizing in itself, not becoming greater or less by addition or diminution. For increase has no place in the infinite, and that which is by its nature passionless excludes all notion of decrease. (Con. Eun. 2.1.69) (NPNF, 257)

"saying they are "many men," is a customary abuse of language"

 We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, and saying they are many men, is a customary abuse of language, and that it would be much the same thing to say they are many human natures. And the truth of this we may see from the following instance. When we address any one, we do not call him by the name of his nature, in order that no confusion may result from the community of the name, as would happen if every one of those who hear it were to think that he himself was the person addressed, because the call is made not by the proper appellation but by the common name of their nature: but we separate him from the multitude by using that name which belongs to him as his own — that, I mean, which signifies the particular subject. Thus there are many who have shared in the nature — many disciples, say, or apostles, or martyrs— but the man in them all is one; since, as has been said, the term man does not belong to the nature of the individual as such, but to that which is common. For Luke is a man, or Stephen is a man; but it does not follow that if any one is a man he is therefore Luke or Stephen: but the idea of the persons admits of that separation which is made by the peculiar attributes considered in each severally, and when they are combined is presented to us by means of number; yet their nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it.

 Φαμὲν τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν κατάχρησίν τινα συνηθείας εἶναι τὸ τοὺς μὴ
διῃρημένους τῇ φύσει κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς φύ σεως ὄνομα πληθυντικῶς ὀνομάζειν καὶ λέγειν ὅτι πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὅπερ ὅμοιόν ἐστι τῷ λέγειν ὅτι πολλαὶ φύσεις
ἀνθρώπιναι. καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ἂν ἡμῖν ἐντεῦθεν γένοιτο·
προσκαλούμενοι γάρ τινα, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως αὐτὸν ὀνομάζομεν, ὡς ἂν μή τινα
πλάνην ἡ κοινότης τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐμποιήσειεν, ἑκάστου τῶν ἀκουόντων ἑαυτὸν
εἶναι τὸν προσκληθέντα νομίζοντος, ὅτι μὴ τῇ ἰδιαζούσῃ προση γορίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ
κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεως ὀνόματος ἡ κλῆσις γίνεται· ἀλλὰ τὴν ἰδίως ἐπικειμένην αὐτῷ
(τὴν σημαντικὴν λέγω τοῦ ὑποκειμένου) φωνὴν εἰπόντες, οὕτως αὐτὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀποκρίνομεν, ὥστε πολλοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς μετεσχη κότας τῆς φύσεως, φέρε εἰπεῖν μαθητὰς ἢ ἀποστόλους ἢ μάρτυρας, ἕνα δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἴπερ, καθὼς εἴρηται, οὐχὶ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεώς ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ὁ Λουκᾶς ἢ ὁ Στέφανος, οὐ μήν, εἴ τις ἄνθρωπος, πάντως καὶ Λουκᾶς ἐστιν ἢ Στέφανος. Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τῶν ὑποστάσεων λόγος διὰ τὰς ἐνθεωρουμένας 3,1.41 ἰδιότητας ἑκάστῳ τὸν διαμερισμὸν ἐπιδέχεται καὶ κατὰ σύν θεσιν ἐν ἀριθμῷ θεωρεῖται· ἡ δὲ φύσις μία ἐστίν, αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡνωμένη καὶ ἀδιάτμητος ἀκριβῶς μονάς, οὐκ αὐ ξανομένη διὰ προσθήκης, οὐ μειουμένη δι' ὑφαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν οὖσα καὶ ἓν διαμένουσα κἂν ἐν πλήθει φαίνηται, ἄσχιστος καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ ὁλόκληρος καὶ τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον οὐ συνδιαιρουμένη. (Ad Ablabium 3.1.39-40)

"a oneness is perceived between the Son and the Father"

"Nevertheless, 'None is good,' he says, 'save one, God'. This is quoted by our opponents. Neither do I myself reject the saying, yet I do not for that reason deny the deity of the Son. But one who confesses the Lord as God, by that confession surely claims at the same time his goodness. For if goodness is proper to God, and the Lord is God, then the Son is proved by these premises to be good. Yet he says that the word 'one' precludes the Son from participating in the good. It is however easy to show that not even this 'one' separates the Father from the Son. In all other cases 'one' has a meaning admitting no duality; in the case of the Father and the Son however, the 'one' is not envisaged as singularity: 'I and the Father are one,' he says. If therefore there is one who is Good, and a oneness is perceived between the Son and the Father, then the Lord, in attesting the unity of goodness, by 'one' claimed this title for himself, since he is one with the Father, and not broken off from the unity of nature."
 
Ἀλλ' οὐδείς, φησίν, ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ εἷς ὁ θεός· τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν ἐναντίων προφέρεται. οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀποβάλλω τὸν λόγον, οὐ μὴν ἀρνοῦμαι διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν θεότητα. ὁ δὲ ὁμολογῶν θεὸν εἶναι τὸν κύριον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ πάντως διὰ τῆς ὁμολογίας ταύτης συνεμαρτύρησεν. εἰ γὰρ ἴδιον θεοῦ ἡ ἀγαθότης, θεὸς δὲ ὁ κύριος, ἀγαθὸς ἄρα διὰ τῶν τεθέντων ὁ υἱὸς ἀναπέφηνεν. ἀλλά, φησί, τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ λέξις ἀποκρίνει τὸν υἱὸν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνίας. ἀλλὰ ῥᾴδιον δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν τοῦτο διαχωρίζει τοῦ 3.9.21 υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τὸ ἓν ἀσυνδύαστον ἔχει τὴν σημασίαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πατρός τε καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἐν μονότητι καθορᾶται. Ἐγὼ γάρ, φησί, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν. εἰ οὖν εἷς μὲν ὁ ἀγαθός, ἑνότης δέ τις ἐν τῷ υἱῷ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ θεωρεῖται, ἄρα ὁ κύριος τῷ ἑνὶ μαρτυρήσας τὴν ἀγαθότητα καὶ ἑαυτῷ διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ταύτην προσεμαρτύρησε τῷ ἓν ὄντι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα καὶ οὐκ ἀπορρηγνυμένῳ τῆς κατὰ
φύσιν ἑνότητος. (Con. Eun. 3,9,20-21)