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"saying they are "many men," is a customary abuse of language"

 We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are not divided in nature by the very name of their common nature in the plural, and saying they are many men, is a customary abuse of language, and that it would be much the same thing to say they are many human natures. And the truth of this we may see from the following instance. When we address any one, we do not call him by the name of his nature, in order that no confusion may result from the community of the name, as would happen if every one of those who hear it were to think that he himself was the person addressed, because the call is made not by the proper appellation but by the common name of their nature: but we separate him from the multitude by using that name which belongs to him as his own — that, I mean, which signifies the particular subject. Thus there are many who have shared in the nature — many disciples, say, or apostles, or martyrs— but the man in them all is one; since, as has been said, the term man does not belong to the nature of the individual as such, but to that which is common. For Luke is a man, or Stephen is a man; but it does not follow that if any one is a man he is therefore Luke or Stephen: but the idea of the persons admits of that separation which is made by the peculiar attributes considered in each severally, and when they are combined is presented to us by means of number; yet their nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it.

 Φαμὲν τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν κατάχρησίν τινα συνηθείας εἶναι τὸ τοὺς μὴ
διῃρημένους τῇ φύσει κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς φύ σεως ὄνομα πληθυντικῶς ὀνομάζειν καὶ λέγειν ὅτι πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὅπερ ὅμοιόν ἐστι τῷ λέγειν ὅτι πολλαὶ φύσεις
ἀνθρώπιναι. καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ἂν ἡμῖν ἐντεῦθεν γένοιτο·
προσκαλούμενοι γάρ τινα, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως αὐτὸν ὀνομάζομεν, ὡς ἂν μή τινα
πλάνην ἡ κοινότης τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐμποιήσειεν, ἑκάστου τῶν ἀκουόντων ἑαυτὸν
εἶναι τὸν προσκληθέντα νομίζοντος, ὅτι μὴ τῇ ἰδιαζούσῃ προση γορίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ
κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεως ὀνόματος ἡ κλῆσις γίνεται· ἀλλὰ τὴν ἰδίως ἐπικειμένην αὐτῷ
(τὴν σημαντικὴν λέγω τοῦ ὑποκειμένου) φωνὴν εἰπόντες, οὕτως αὐτὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀποκρίνομεν, ὥστε πολλοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς μετεσχη κότας τῆς φύσεως, φέρε εἰπεῖν μαθητὰς ἢ ἀποστόλους ἢ μάρτυρας, ἕνα δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἴπερ, καθὼς εἴρηται, οὐχὶ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεώς ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ὁ Λουκᾶς ἢ ὁ Στέφανος, οὐ μήν, εἴ τις ἄνθρωπος, πάντως καὶ Λουκᾶς ἐστιν ἢ Στέφανος. Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τῶν ὑποστάσεων λόγος διὰ τὰς ἐνθεωρουμένας 3,1.41 ἰδιότητας ἑκάστῳ τὸν διαμερισμὸν ἐπιδέχεται καὶ κατὰ σύν θεσιν ἐν ἀριθμῷ θεωρεῖται· ἡ δὲ φύσις μία ἐστίν, αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡνωμένη καὶ ἀδιάτμητος ἀκριβῶς μονάς, οὐκ αὐ ξανομένη διὰ προσθήκης, οὐ μειουμένη δι' ὑφαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν οὖσα καὶ ἓν διαμένουσα κἂν ἐν πλήθει φαίνηται, ἄσχιστος καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ ὁλόκληρος καὶ τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον οὐ συνδιαιρουμένη. (Ad Ablabium 3.1.39-40)

"human governments experience such quickly-repeated revolutions[...]"

"human governments experience such quickly-repeated revolutions for this very reason, that it is impracticable that those to whom nature has given equal rights should be excluded from power, but her impulse is instinct in all to make themselves equal with the dominant party, when all are of the same blood. αἱ δὲ ἀνθρώπιναι δυναστεῖαι τούτου χάριν ἀγχιστρόφους ἔχουσι τὰς μεταβολάς, ὅτι οὐ δέχεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ὁμότιμον μὴ ἰσομοιρεῖν [ἐν] τῷ κρείττονι, ἀλλά τις ἔγκειται φυσικὴ πᾶσιν ἐπιθυμία πρὸς τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἐξισάζεσθαι, ὅταν ὁμόφυλον ᾖ" (Against Eunomius, p. 84, 1.1.527-528)

“Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits.”


“Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits.” (Gregory of Nyssa, Con. Eun. 2.1.96)
 
(οὐκοῦν μαθόντες, ὅσον τῆς φύσεως τὸ διαλλάττον ἐστί, τοῖς ἰδίοις ὅροις δι' ἡσυχίας ἐμμένωμεν)

"[...]when the partition wall of evil that blocks us up has been taken away, the two will become one and coalesce, because both are united to the good.”

“We should […] beware of thinking that […] the life of the virtuous is conceived as a duality; on the contrary, when the partition wall of evil that blocks us up has been taken away, the two will become one and coalesce, because both are united to the good.” (Beat., p. 165)

“It has been said by wise men that man is a little world in himself and contains all the elements which go to complete the universe."

“It has been said by wise men that man is a little world in himself and contains all the elements which go to complete the universe. If this view is a true one (and so it seems), we perhaps shall need no other ally than it to establish the truth of our conception of the soul.” (De An. et Res., NPNF, p. 433)

”Our surest refuge is not to fail to recognize ourselves, not to believe that we are seeing ourselves when we are seeing only something that surrounds us[...]”


”Our surest refuge is not to fail to recognize ourselves, not to believe that we are seeing ourselves when we are seeing only something that surrounds us[...]” (In Cant., PG 44,804 tr. quoted from Balthasar, Presence and Thought, p. 121)

"[...]when human nature is liberated from the double composition, and returns perfectly to the good, having become simple and impossible to represent and truly one , then that which appears will be the same as that which is hidden[...]"

"Since then, it is believed that the divine nature (τό θεῖον) is simple (ἁπλοῦν), free from composition (ἀσύνθετον) and impossible to represent (ἀσχημάτιστον), when human nature (τό ἀντθρώπινον) is liberated from the double composition, and returns perfectly (ἀκριβῶς) to the good, having become simple and impossible to represent and truly one (ώς αληθῶς ἕν γενομενον), then that which appears will be the same as that which is hidden, and that which is hidden the same as that which appears, then truly is carried to accomplishment the beatitude and such man are truly called sons of God, proclaimed blessed according to the promise of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for eternity. Amen" (Gal 1.5, Heb 13.21 and 2 Tm 4.18) (On the Beatitudes, GNO VII/2, 160, tr. Maspero, 2007, p. 73)

"[...]whosoever searches the whole of Revelation will find therein no doctrine of the Divine nature, nor indeed of anything else that has a substantial existence[...]"

"[...]whosoever searches the whole of Revelation (θεόπνευστον) will find therein no doctrine of the Divine nature, nor indeed of anything else that has a substantial existence, so that we pass our lives in ignorance of much, being ignorant first of all of ourselves, as men, and then of all things besides. For who is there who has arrived at a comprehension of his own soul?" (Contra E. 2. book, NPNF, p. 261, GNO 106)

“How can a man be master of another's life, if he is not even master of his own?[...]"

“How can a man be master [a magistrate] of another's life, if he is not even master of his own? Hence he ought to be poor in spirit, and look at Him who for our sake became poor of His own will; let him consider that we are all equal by nature, and not exalt himself impertinently against his own race on account of that deceptive show of office[...]" (On the Beatitudes, Graef, 1954, pp. 94-95)

"[...]man was brought into the world last after the creation, not being rejected to the last as worthless, but as one whom it behoved to be king over his subjects at his very birth."

"[...]man was brought into the world last after the creation, not being rejected to the last as worthless, but as one whom it behoved to be king over his subjects at his very birth. And as a good host does not bring his guest to his house before the preparation of his feast, but, when he has made all due preparation, and decked with their proper adornments his house, his couches, his table, brings his guest home when things suitable for his refreshment are in readiness,—in the same manner the rich and munificent Entertainer of our nature, when He had decked the habitation with beauties of every kind, and prepared this great and varied banquet, then introduced man, assigning to him as his task not the acquiring of what was not there, but the enjoyment of the things which were there; and for this reason He gives him as foundations the instincts of a twofold organization, blending the Divine with the earthy, that by means of both he may be naturally and properly disposed to each enjoyment, enjoying God by means of his more divine nature, and the good things of earth by the sense that is akin to them." (De Opificio Homini, On the Making of Man, NPNF, p. 390)

”You have subjected all things to man, declares the word through the prophecy[...]"

”You have subjected all things to man, declares the word through the prophecy, and in the text it lists the things subject, cattle and oxen and sheep (Ps 8,7-8). Surely human beings have not been produced from your [the slave-owners] cattle? Surely cows have not conceived human stock? Irrationial beasts are the only slaves of mankind. […] But by dividing the human species in two with 'slavery' and 'ownership' you have caused it to be enslaved to itself, and to be the owner of itself. I got me slave-girls and slaves.’ For what price, tell me? What did you find in existence worth as much as this human nature? [...] God said, Let us make man in our own image and likeness (Gen. 1,26). If he is in the likeness of God, and rules the whole earth, and has been granted authority over everything on earth from God, who is his buyer, tell me? Who is his seller? To God alone belongs this power; or, rather, not even to God himself. For his gracious gifts, it says, are irrevocable. God would not therefore reduce the human race to slavery, since he himself, when we had been enslaved to sin, spontaneously recalled us to freedom. But if God does not enslave what is free, who is he that sets his own power above God’s?” (In Eccl. 336, Hall)

”Since the spirit is in itself something thinking and immaterial, it would have a savage and incommunicable beauty if its interior movement had not been capable of being revealed by an ingenious invention[...]"

”Since the spirit is in itself something thinking and immaterial, it would have a savage (αμιχτον) and incommunicable beauty if its interior movement had not been capable of being revealed by an ingenious invention (ἐπίνοια). It is to this end that this organic constitution was necessary, so that the interior movement might succeed in being interpreted (ἑρμηνευση) through the varied formation of articulations by touching, like a plectrum, the organs destined for the voice.” (De Op. Hom. tr. Balthasar, p. 60)

“'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?' the apostle asks; and I ask further, who has understood his own mind?[...]"

“'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?' the apostle asks; and I ask further, who has understood his own mind? Let those tell us who consider the nature of God to be within their comprehension, whether they understand themselves – if they know the nature of their own mind. […] The image [εἰκόνα] is properly an image so long as it fails in none of those attributes which we perceive in the archetype; […] therefore, since one of the attributes we contemplate in the Divine nature is
incomprehensibility of essence (τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τῆς οὐσίας), it is clearly
necessary that in this point the image should be able to show its imitation of
the archetype. For if, while the archetype transcends comprehension, the
nature of the image were comprehended, the contrary (ἐναντιότης )
character of the attributes we behold in them would prove the defect of the
image; but since the nature of our mind, which is the likeness of the Creator,
evades (διαφεύγει) our knowledge (γνῶσιν), it has an accurate (ἀκριβῆ)
resemblance (ὁμοιότητα) to the superior nature, figuring by its own
unknowableness (ἀγνώστῳ) the incomprehensible Nature (τὴν ἀκατάληπτον
φύσιν). ” (De op. 155-156)