”Having noted
in the aforementioned psalm (4,8), therefore, that the goal (τέλος)
of virtue is peace, rest, and the abode which is simple and unmingled
with the passions, which is attained on the basis of the hope of
participating in God (τοῦ θεοῦ μετουσίας),
that which is contrary to this was
pointed out there by means of silence.”
(In Ins., GNO 36-37)
Viser opslag med etiketten apophaticism. Vis alle opslag
Viser opslag med etiketten apophaticism. Vis alle opslag
“[...]it amounts to the same, whether we speak of God as unsusceptible of evil, or whether we call Him good;"
“it amounts to the same, whether we speak of God as unsusceptible of evil (ἀνεπίδεκτόν τε πονηρίας), or whether we call Him good; whether we confess that He is immortal, or say that He ever liveth. For we understand no difference in the sense of these terms, but we signify one and the same thing by both, though the one may seem to convey the notion of affirmation, and the other of negation. And so again, when we speak of God as the First Cause of all things, or again, when we speak of Him as without cause,
we are guilty of no contradiction in sense, declaring as we do by
either name that God is the prime Ruler and First Cause of all.
Accordingly when we speak of Him as without cause,
and as Lord of all, in the former case we signify what does not attach
to Him, in the latter case what does; it being possible, as I have said,
by a change of the things signified, to give an opposite sense to the
words that express them, and to signify a property by a word which for
the time takes a negative form, and vice versa.”
-->(CE 2.1.134, NPNF, p. 263)
-->(CE 2.1.134, NPNF, p. 263)
ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἀνεπίδεκτόν τε πονηρίας τὸν θεὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὀνομάσαι, καὶ ἀθάνατον ὁμολογῆσαι καὶ ἀεὶ ζῶντα εἰπεῖν· οὐδεμίαν γὰρ ἐν τούτοις κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον διαφορὰν ἐννοοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἓν δι' ἑκατέρων τῶν λόγων ἀποσημαίνομεν, 2.1.135 κἂν τὸ μὲν θέσιν τὸ δὲ ἀναίρεσίν τινος ἔχειν δοκῇ. ὡσ αύτως καὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν λέγοντες τὸν θεὸν καὶ πάλιν ἄν αρχον ὀνομάζοντες οὐδὲν κατὰ τὰς ἐννοίας μαχόμεθα, καθ' ἑκάτερον τῶν λεγομένων ἀρχηγὸν καὶ
αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς ἀποφαίνοντες· ὥστε κἂν ἄναρχον εἴπωμεν κἂν τοῦ παντὸς
ἀρχηγέτην, τῷ μὲν τὸ μὴ προσόν, τῷ δευτέρῳ δὲ τὸ προσὸν παρεστήσαμεν, δυνατοῦ ὄντος καθὼς εἴρηται διὰ τῆς τῶν σημαινομένων ὑπαλλαγῆς μεταλλάξαι πρὸς τὸ ἐναν τίον τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐμφάσεις καὶ τῷ νῦν ἀπεμφαίνοντι τέως ὀνόματι διά τινος μετασχηματισμοῦ τὸ προσὸν γνωρι 2.1.136 σθῆναι καὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον.
αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς ἀποφαίνοντες· ὥστε κἂν ἄναρχον εἴπωμεν κἂν τοῦ παντὸς
ἀρχηγέτην, τῷ μὲν τὸ μὴ προσόν, τῷ δευτέρῳ δὲ τὸ προσὸν παρεστήσαμεν, δυνατοῦ ὄντος καθὼς εἴρηται διὰ τῆς τῶν σημαινομένων ὑπαλλαγῆς μεταλλάξαι πρὸς τὸ ἐναν τίον τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐμφάσεις καὶ τῷ νῦν ἀπεμφαίνοντι τέως ὀνόματι διά τινος μετασχηματισμοῦ τὸ προσὸν γνωρι 2.1.136 σθῆναι καὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον.
“[...]when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable pureness as regards this[...]"
“[...]when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable pureness as regards this: when we consider death's dissolution to be the worst of ills, we give the name of Immortal and Indissoluble at once to Him Who is removed from every conception of that kind” (CE 2 477, NPNF, p. 298)
"[...]it is not possible for Christ not to be justice and purity and truth and estrangement from all evil[...]"
"If, therefore, someone puts on the name of Christ, but does not exhibit in his life what is indicated by the term, such a person belies the name and puts on a lifeless mask in accordance with the model proposed to us. For it is not possible for Christ not to be justice and purity and truth and estrangement from all evil, nor is it possible to be a Christian (that is, truly a Christian) without displaying in oneself a participation in these virtues. If one can give a definition of Christianity, we shall define it as follows: Christianity is an imitation of the divine nature." (Prof., Jaeger 133.15-20, tr. Callahan)
"It does not say that God's essence is without limits, judging it rash even to express this in a concept;"
"Ah the wonder of it! Why does the sacred text fear to approach the glory of the divine mystery, so that it has not even expressed any of those effects which are outside his nature? It does not say that God's essence is without limits, judging it rash even to express this in a concept; rather it merely marvels at the vision of the magnificence of His glory." (Eccl., 7, Jaeger, V, 415)
"[...]we either convey the idea of goodness by the negation of badness, or vice versa."
"[...]we either convey the idea of goodness by the negation of badness, or vice versa (∆ι' ὧν ἢ τὸ χρηστότερον ἀναλαμβάνομεν νόημα διὰ τῆς τῶν πονηρῶν ἀποφάσεως, ἢ τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ταῖς ὑπονοίαις τρεπόμεθα, τῇ τῶν καλῶν ἀφαιρέσει τὸ πονηρὸν ἐνδειξάμενοι.). Well, then, if one thinks so with regard to the matter now before us, one will not fail to gain a proper conception of it. The question is,- What are we to think of Mind in its very essence? Now granted that the inquirer has had his doubts set at rest as to the existence of the thing in question, owing to the activities which it displays to us, and only wants to know what it is, he will have adequately discovered it by being told that it is not that which our senses perceive, neither a colour, nor a form, nor a hardness, nor a weight, nor a quantity, nor a cubic dimension, nor a point, nor anything else perceptible in matter; supposing, that is, that there does exist a something beyond all these." (De An. PG 46.37,On the Soul and the Resurrection, NPNF, p. 436)
"[...]whosoever searches the whole of Revelation will find therein no doctrine of the Divine nature, nor indeed of anything else that has a substantial existence[...]"
"[...]whosoever searches the whole of Revelation (θεόπνευστον) will find therein no doctrine of the Divine nature, nor indeed of anything else that has a substantial existence, so that we pass our lives in ignorance of much, being ignorant first of all of ourselves, as men, and then of all things besides. For who is there who has arrived at a comprehension of his own soul?" (Contra E. 2. book, NPNF, p. 261, GNO 106)
"[...]the Divine is by its nature life-giving. Yet the characteristic of the divine nature is to transcend all characteristics.[...]"
"[...]the Divine is by its nature life-giving. Yet the characteristic of the divine nature is to transcend all characteristics. Therefore, he who thinks God is something to be known does not have life, because he has turned from true Being to what he considers by sense perception to have being." (Life of Moses, Ferguson, §234)
"[...]the definition of truth is this: not to have a mistaken apprehension of Being."
"In my view the definition of truth is this: not to have a mistaken apprehension of Being." (De Vita Moysis II, Ferguson, 1978, p. 23)
"[...]nothing that is limiting, whether name, or concept or thing, can be considered as His attribute[...]"
"The blessed and eternal substance of God, that surpasses all understanding, contains all perfection within itself and cannot be limited. Hence nothing that is limiting, whether name, or concept or thing, can be considered as His attribute, as, for example, time, place, colour, shape, form, mass, magnitude, dimension." (Comm. Song, Musurillo, From Glory to Glory, 2001, p. 189)
“'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?' the apostle asks; and I ask further, who has understood his own mind?[...]"
“'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?' the apostle asks; and I ask further, who has understood his own mind? Let those tell us who consider the nature of God to be within their comprehension, whether they understand themselves – if they know the nature of their own mind. […] The image [εἰκόνα] is properly an image so long as it fails in none of those attributes which we perceive in the archetype; […] therefore, since one of the attributes we contemplate in the Divine nature is
incomprehensibility of essence (τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τῆς οὐσίας), it is clearly
necessary that in this point the image should be able to show its imitation of
the archetype. For if, while the archetype transcends comprehension, the
nature of the image were comprehended, the contrary (ἐναντιότης )
character of the attributes we behold in them would prove the defect of the
image; but since the nature of our mind, which is the likeness of the Creator,
evades (διαφεύγει) our knowledge (γνῶσιν), it has an accurate (ἀκριβῆ)
resemblance (ὁμοιότητα) to the superior nature, figuring by its own
unknowableness (ἀγνώστῳ) the incomprehensible Nature (τὴν ἀκατάληπτον
φύσιν). ” (De op. 155-156)
incomprehensibility of essence (τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τῆς οὐσίας), it is clearly
necessary that in this point the image should be able to show its imitation of
the archetype. For if, while the archetype transcends comprehension, the
nature of the image were comprehended, the contrary (ἐναντιότης )
character of the attributes we behold in them would prove the defect of the
image; but since the nature of our mind, which is the likeness of the Creator,
evades (διαφεύγει) our knowledge (γνῶσιν), it has an accurate (ἀκριβῆ)
resemblance (ὁμοιότητα) to the superior nature, figuring by its own
unknowableness (ἀγνώστῳ) the incomprehensible Nature (τὴν ἀκατάληπτον
φύσιν). ” (De op. 155-156)
“[...]it is a sacred duty to use of Him names privative of the things abhorrent to His Nature[...]”
“But if it be part of our religion to attribute to Him none of these things, then it is a sacred duty to use of Him names privative of the things abhorrent to His Nature,
and to say all that we have so often enumerated already, viz. that He
is imperishable, and unending, and ungenerate, and the other terms of
that class, where the sense inherent in each only informs us of the
privation of that which is obvious to our perception, but does not
interpret the actual nature of that which is thus removed from those abhorrent conditions.” (CE 2, NPNF p. 308)
"εἰ δὲ τούτων εὐαγές ἐστιν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτὸν ἐννοεῖν, εὐσεβὲς ἂν εἴη πάντως τοῖς χωριστικοῖς τῶν ἀπεμφαινόντων ῥήμασιν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ κεχρῆσθαι καὶ λέ γειν ταῦτα ἃ ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἄφθαρτόν τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητον καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ὅσα τοῦ τοιούτου εἴδους ἐστί, τῆς ἐγκειμένης ἑκάστῳ τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐμφά σεως μόνον τὸν χωρισμὸν τῶν ἡμῖν προχείρων εἰς κατα νόησιν διδασκούσης, οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν ἀπεμφαι νόντων κεχωρισμένην ἑρμηνευούσης." (PG 2.1.581-582), (Con. Eun. II 581), (GNO I. 396.3-4).
"εἰ δὲ τούτων εὐαγές ἐστιν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτὸν ἐννοεῖν, εὐσεβὲς ἂν εἴη πάντως τοῖς χωριστικοῖς τῶν ἀπεμφαινόντων ῥήμασιν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ κεχρῆσθαι καὶ λέ γειν ταῦτα ἃ ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἄφθαρτόν τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητον καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ὅσα τοῦ τοιούτου εἴδους ἐστί, τῆς ἐγκειμένης ἑκάστῳ τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐμφά σεως μόνον τὸν χωρισμὸν τῶν ἡμῖν προχείρων εἰς κατα νόησιν διδασκούσης, οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν ἀπεμφαι νόντων κεχωρισμένην ἑρμηνευούσης." (PG 2.1.581-582), (Con. Eun. II 581), (GNO I. 396.3-4).
"This truly is the vision of God: never to be satisfied in the desire to see him."
Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὄντως τὸ ἰδεῖν τὸν Θεὸν τὸ μηδέποτε τῆς ἐπιθυμίας κόρον εὑρεῖν.
”This truly is the vision of God: never to be satisfied in the desire to see him.” (De Vita Moysis, TLG 2017.042, 239)
”This truly is the vision of God: never to be satisfied in the desire to see him.” (De Vita Moysis, TLG 2017.042, 239)
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