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"every created being is distant, by an equal degree of inferiority, from that which is the Highest"

"every created being is distant, by an equal degree of inferiority, from that which
is the Highest, Who is unapproachable by reason of the sublimity of His Being: the whole universe is in value the same distance beneath Him. For that which is absolutely inaccessible does not allow access to some one thing while it is unapproachable by another, but it transcends all existences by an equal sublimity." (Or cat. 27,4)

Wide and insurmountable is the interval that divides and fences off uncreated from created nature

Yet, if we weigh even their comprehension with the majesty of Him Who really is, it may be that if any one should venture to say that even their power of understanding is not far superior to our own weakness, his conjecture would fall within the limits of probability, for wide and insurmountable is the interval that divides and fences off uncreated from created nature (πολὺ γὰρ τὸ μέσον καὶ ἀδιεξίτητον, ᾦ πρὸς τὴν κτιστὴν οὐσίαν ἠ ἄκτιστος φύσις διατετείχισται). The latter is limited, the former not. The latter is confined within its own boundaries according to the pleasure of its Maker. The former is bounded only by infinity. The latter stretches itself out within certain degrees of extension, limited by time and space: the former transcends all notion of degree, baffling curiosity from every point of view. In this life we can apprehend the beginning and the end of all things that exist, but the beatitude that is above the creature admits neither end nor beginning, but is above all that is connoted by either, being ever the same, self-dependent, not travelling on by degrees from one point to another in its life; for there is no participation of other life in its life, such that we might infer end and beginning; but, be it what it may, it is life energizing in itself, not becoming greater or less by addition or diminution. For increase has no place in the infinite, and that which is by its nature passionless excludes all notion of decrease. (Con. Eun. 2.1.69) (NPNF, 257)

"there is a similarity of names between things human and things divine, revealing nevertheless underneath this sameness a wide difference of meanings"



"Wide, indeed, is the interval in all else that divides the human from the divine; experience cannot point here below to anything at all resembling in amount what we may guess at and imagine there. So likewise, as regards the meaning of our terms, though there may be, so far as words go, some likeness between man and the Eternal, yet the gulf between these two worlds is the real measure of the separation of meanings. For instance, our Lord calls God a ‘man’ that was a ‘householder’ in the parable; but though this title is ever so familiar to us, will the person we think of and the person there meant be of the same description; and will our ‘house’ be the same as that large house, in which, as the Apostle says, there are the vessels of gold, and those of silver, and those of the other materials which are recounted? Or will not those rather be beyond our immediate apprehension and to be contemplated in a blessed immortality, while ours are earthern, and to dissolve to earth? So in almost all the other terms there is a similarity of names between things human and things divine, revealing nevertheless underneath this sameness a wide difference of meanings." (Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium GNO I 205-208)

"the created and the uncreate are as diametrically opposed to each other as their names are"


"the created and the uncreate are as diametrically opposed to each other as their names are" CE 1.1.504, p. 81) (τὸ γὰρ κτιστὸν καὶ τὸ ἄκτιστον ἐκ διαμέτρου πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει)

"For it is not possible for anything which was created or is created not to have its being either in time or space."

"For it is not possible for anything which was created or is created not to have its being either in time or space." (GNO I.1.370)

“Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits.”


“Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits.” (Gregory of Nyssa, Con. Eun. 2.1.96)
 
(οὐκοῦν μαθόντες, ὅσον τῆς φύσεως τὸ διαλλάττον ἐστί, τοῖς ἰδίοις ὅροις δι' ἡσυχίας ἐμμένωμεν)

”Thus the whole created order is unable to get out of itself through a comprehensive vision[...]"

”Thus the whole created order is unable to get out of itself through a comprehensive vision, but remains continually enclosed within itself, and whatever it beholds, it is looking at itself. And even if it somehow thinks it is looking at something beyond itself, that which it sees outside itself has no being. One may struggle to surpass or transcend diastemic conception (διάστηματικην εννοιαν) by the understanding of the created universe, but he does not transcend. For in every object it conceptually discovers, it always comprehends the diastema in the being of the apprehended object, and diastema is nothing other than creation itself.” (In Eccl. GNO V, 412, 6-14)

"When he [Eunomius] pronounces that the life of the Father is prior to that of the Son, he places a certain interval (διαστήματί) between the two[...]"

”When he [Eunomius] pronounces that the life of the Father is prior to that of the Son, he places a certain interval (διαστήματί) between the two; now, he must mean, either that this interval is infinite (ἄπειρόν), or that it is included within fixed limits (τισι πέρασι). But the principle of an intervening mean will not allow him to call it infinite; he would annul thereby the very conception of Father and Son and the thought of anything connecting them, as long as this infinite were limited on neither side, with no idea of a Father cutting it short above, nor that of a Son checking it below. The very nature of the infinite is, to be extended in either direction, and to have no bounds of any kind. […] What I say, then, is this: that this view of theirs will bring us to the conclusion that the Father is not from everlasting, but from a definite point in time.” (Contra Eunomium, TLG 2017.030, 344)